The common nomenclature of ethnicity, race and colour has been found wanting in theorising and dealing with the Muslim presence in Britain. This study of 24 prominent British Muslims -including political, policy and academic/intellectual 'elite' -explores the making and representation of Muslim identity in Britain. We explore this through three considerations: Muslimness as a 'master status'; leadership and representation in relation to British Muslims; and the public performance of Muslimness during 'key moments'.
Introduction
Notions of race, colour and ethnicity have dominated both theoretical and policy considerations in relation to population diversity in the United Kingdom. Recently, however, the focus of debate has shifted from the politics of colour and race to ethnicity and religion (Peach 2005) . Modood and Ahmad have noted that because of the 'political crises featuring Muslims rather than Asians or non-whites per se -from the Rushdie Affair in 1988-89 to the first Gulf war in 1991, the controversies around Muslim faith schools, 11 September 2001, the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 7 July 2005 2 bombings -the term 'Asian' has ceased to have much content as a political category' (Modood and Ahmad 2007, p. 187) . 'Muslim' has instead gained considerable prominence as a category of identification in recent debates on diversity and its management. This shift has also been highlighted in 'official' state categories of identification for ethnic and migrant minorities. The 2001 Census included a voluntary question on religion. Future Censuses are likely to build on this and, additionally, include questions on 'national identity' (ONS 2007) . This is an important shift in the official discourse on identity and belonging, a move also welcomed by the Muslim Council of Britain (ONS 2007) .
One consequence of this shift to 'Muslim' as the predominant identity is the racialisation of Muslimness. Communities characterized by differences of denomination, regional background, ethnicity and linguistic heritage, are increasingly presented as a homogenous, undifferentiated mass, now seen akin to an ethnic or racial group, with presumed deterministic values diametrically opposed to, and threatening the values of the civilized West (e.g. Kundani 2007; also Naber 2000, for the USA).
In his powerful analysis of anti-Muslim racism, Kundani notes how being a Muslim increasingly acts as a racialised symbol of difference, with Islam being portrayed in public and policy discourses as an ethnicity or race, opposed to 'whiteness' or 'Britishness'. The fundamental role of Muslim civilization in the very birth of modern Europe is conveniently forgotten (Fletcher 1992; Armstrong 2000; Hellyer 2007 ). Equally, alliances with those of other faiths and no faith, over a range of struggles over resources, policies and recognition, go unacknowledged. In policy and political terms, Islamophobia is often at the heart of the politics of recognition of Muslims in Western European discourses (Eade 1996; Vertovec 2002; Kundani 2007) . In the post September 11 th and July 7 th context, such debates have become even more prominent. As a result of the 'war on terror' Muslims have been propelled to the 3 forefront of the political agenda and questions have emerged in relation to the fit between British or Western values and Muslim identity (Vertovec 2002) . This has serious implications for Muslims and how they espouse or resist various identifications. Meanwhile, attempts continue to be made to theorise these phenomena, often in the wake of challenges posed by political and policy crisis (Asad 1990; Hellyer 2007; Kundani 2007; Parekh 2008) .
Given this background, in this paper we will explore the interactional order of Muslim identity formation and its different manifestations during key moments. Using empirical data from our study of prominent Muslims in Britain, we will examine the way our respondents articulate the emergence of
Muslimness as a primary identification of Muslims, how Muslimness is represented and how it is lived or performed during key moments (the Rushdie affair, September 11 or the Israeli attack on Gaza).
Methods and Analysis
Our study focuses on qualitative interviews with 24 prominent Muslims. It aimed to gauge their perspectives and experiences in relation to the challenges Muslims face, their own religious and political attitudes, the future of British or European Islam and how their Muslim identity may interplay with their professional lives. It relied on loosely structured conversations, allowing the discussion to be shaped by the respondent around key themes.
Access to 'elites' is not easy. In this study, personal knowledge as well as referrals from other respondents and colleagues assisted recruitment. The sampling frame consisted of potential respondents personally known to Ahmad, those identified from Muslim and other websites, names listed in the Muslim Power 100 publication and suggestions from colleagues and friends. included seven senior academics, two writers and one artist. Further, these are flexible categories and many respondents could be categorised under more than one of these categories. For these respondents the category used reflects their current predominant role. . To protect anonymity, we refer to respondents as follows -Politic 1-6 identifies the political elite; policy 1-8 refers to the eight policy elite; and academic1-10 relates to the academic and intellectual elite.
Transcriptions were checked against the recorded interviews and corrected, including for Islamic terms.
The initial analysis by Evergeti, was developed through dialogue between and further interrogation of data by both authors. Our analytical approach is an interactionist one, looking at the meanings social actors attach to particular social settings and the way they form and negotiate their identities according to their interpretation of given situations. This involves a descriptive and inductive analysis of the experiences, attitudes, relationships, meanings and actions of those under study (Evergeti 2006a) . Such an approach reveals the interactional dynamics of group identity and its various manifestations in various social contexts. The analysis involved a number of phases: a close examination of the interview data; identifying important topics in each interview; comparing and contrasting material in all interviews and creating a taxonomy of key themes.
Findings and Discussion
The interviews covered a number of themes. In this paper we will concentrate on the issue of Muslim identity, organising our findings under three key, overlapping areas -the journey towards Alongside external ascriptions of Muslim identity, Muslims themselves were active participants in the making of the 'Muslim identity'. This, sometimes 'fictive unity', as described by Werbner (1991), was sustained both by common distress at the hardships experienced by Muslims across the globe, by reference to the notion of a global Ummah, and as noted by Academic 6 above, by globalisation and 9 technology (see also Klausen 2005, p. 27) . A local authority chief officer (Policy 2) noted that
Muslims felt under siege and:
… the impact of that is that it is creating Muslim community identity in a sense, because when you are feeling oppressed or you see an aggressor, you stand together and you create an identity, a new identity…
Whether a unified 'Muslim identity' is a positive development or not, depends on who attributes or claims it, how it is performed in the public sphere and the symbolic and ideological boundaries of belonging that it encompasses. All of the respondents' accounts of the complex and sometimes contradictory meaning attached to Muslim identity indicate the way in which an identity is a constantly negotiated, contingent performance, 'an emergent property of an ongoing interpersonal bargaining' (Watson 1981, p. 453) . Nor can the move to Muslimness as the primary identity be absolute. Many of our older respondents, active in colour and race oriented struggles of the last three decades of the 20 th Century, found it difficult to sustain a coherent narrative around Muslimness, constantly slipping into the language of race and racism; some nostalgic about the one-time broader alliances across religious and ethnic boundaries, others regarding this as an era of naivety. In some cases, respondents attempted to forcefully assert a 'normative' Muslim unity, later accepting the diversity and sectarian rifts within the Muslim communities. This is illustrated by the following terse response , to Ahmad's contention that the Muslim society suffers from sectarian divides:
Policy 7 There's no sects in Islam. There's schools of thought. [sits up and raises voice to make
There's schools of thought.
Policy 7 There's no sects in Islam. All believe in Allah, the Prophet, the Quran.
Ahmad
That's fine, that's fine.
Policy 7
There's no difference whatsoever.
As we will see, this respondent later laments the internal divides within the Muslim communities in relation to representational leadership.
While the emergence of Muslimness as a primary identity and its representation formed a key theme in these narratives, how Muslimness was negotiated with other identity claims was not lost on our -making us all pray in the same way, making us all believe in the same and practice our faith in one particular way -is a recent development that is not at the heart of Islam.
She related this diversity to the lack of a formal central authority or clergy in Islam, a point also made by others, although one noted the existence of de facto clergy in the shape of Imams and Ulema (Academic 10):
We have never had a Church, we have never had a Pope, we have never had a kind of higher council of Ulema speaking on our behalf …and this is why it has managed to succeed and spread in places so different from the cultural, geographical origin of it. …it is a religion which allows the incorporation of difference …there are multiple opinions, multiple fatwahs, depending where we are …. The problem of weak and uninspiring leadership, according to some, extended beyond party politics:
And one of the big things around 7/7 is, my goodness, you know, our leadership is terribly weak, who's come forward here, the same usual suspects, parochial, biraderi driven, self Several were critical of a lack of Muslim women in representational roles, including a female prospective parliamentarian (Politic 6), who lamented the lack of support from the Muslim community and particular difficulty in access to the male space of the local mosque, something she felt would be afforded to male Muslim and both male and female non-Muslim candidates. Respondents blamed patriarchy rather than Islam for this marginalization, one (Policy 7) citing that Prophet Muhammad had appointed a woman, 'Umme Waraqa as an Imam…', and that Aysha, the Prophet's wife, was an acknowledged teacher and leader, even leading in a battle against Ali, the fourth Khalif. However, several of our respondents also talked about Muslim women providing leadership, including in political campaigning and civil action in relation to key events, as we see below.
'Forty times a woman before a Muslim before the Gaza conflict, forty times a Muslim than a woman now': performing Muslimness during 'key moments'
Identity plays out in the everyday -the school gate conversation, the work place, what you wear or eat -as well as during 'key moments'. Several noted that the negative symbolism of being a Muslim has affected the everyday realities of Britain's Muslims -the journey from being 'black' to 'terrorist', as noted above. Hughes (1945) has explained how social situations result in contradictions and dilemmas of status and in what follows we will focus on how Muslim identity is 'performed' during three key moments.
The Rushdie Affair: For several respondents, the Muslim identity as key public identification of British Muslims, above race, ethnicity or regional identifications, emerged with the Rushdie affair -see Muslim and …my spiritual mentor -I spoke to him about it. I realised how hurt he was …and I realised that Muslims weren't going to be able to take this. Because up to that point my instincts were pretty libertarian …so yeah, 'let's talk about things rather than ban books' Ahmad Many people would argue that the academic discourses in relation to ethnicity and race and racism were felt wanting in terms of dealing with Satanic Verses and the way in which Muslims reacted.
Academic 5 Yeah, well I entirely agree with that and so I said to my Dad 'what can someone like me do?' … He said 'look, our family has a strong sense of public service and public duty, you are a privileged person with the education you have achieved, you should help your community in whatever ways that you can. But I will give you one piece of advice and that is don't get entangled with the Mullahs' and … in a way I have just followed that advice.
Academic 10 also engaged in a range of intellectual interventions -writing, speaking and appearances in media. While defending the right of Muslims to be offended by the Satanic Verses, these and other respondents argued the importance of the kind of interventions above; arguing one's case rather than burning books. According to our respondents, the Rushdie affair had firmly separated Muslims apart from other minority ethnic and faith communities. Muslims now personified 'otherness'. The affair created a stigmatised identity with negative stereotypes of the alien, uncompromising, un-British Muslim firmly ingrained in the public imagination in a matter of days. Muslims were no longer a collective of diverse communities but were portrayed as a monolithic, immutable mass, behaving in deterministic manner against the interests and values of civilised Western people.
September 11 and July 7: While Muslims were associated with intolerance and backwardness after the Rushdie affair, many respondents noted that they were being labelled as terrorists and extremists after the 9/11 and 7/7 bombings, having to work hard to resist this ascribed 'master status'. 'I think … . 9/11, as a moment, has had a defining impact on identity, place, purpose and that is having an impact', noted a one time senior civil servant (Policy 5) working closely with the British government in September 2001, a view also supported by a female parliamentarian (Politic 4):
… there was a different view of Muslims as being at least industrious and relatively quiet and that really was completely shattered by 9/11. So we now have the added burden of terrorism and Islamophobia -which does make it extremely difficult. I mean, two difficulties -one is that the label terrorist, … but also any money that the Government is spending they are spending it on extremism. So if we want to do any kind of community research we have to adopt the name extremist, do it under the label extremism in one way or another, albeit preventing extremism.
Almost all our interviewees protested that following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, the media have used essentialist 'securitised' (Brown 2008) portrayals of Muslims: As a senior local politician (Politic 3) put it, exaggerating to make a point, '…the image of the Muslim after 9/11 has become so distorted that every Muslim now is perceived to be a terrorist…' In Mamdani's words this has created notions of 'good Muslims' who are 'secular and westernized' and 'bad Muslims' who are 'anti-modern and fanatical' (Mamdani 2004); and our respondents argued that 'good Muslims' were constantly challenged by government and the media to repudiate radicalism and terrorism. The discussion of the stigmatization of Muslim identity as inherently 'extremist' also opens up the question of 'authenticity claims' that is who is accepted as a legitimate member of the specific social group and who is not. Our respondents reacted not only against the external stereotypes but also against extremists and terrorists, with whom, in their view, the British Muslims have little sympathy. They also resented the constant external demands, including from the government, that 'moderate Muslims' demonstrate their loyalty to the state by standing up against the radicals in their communities, arguing that the communities are already doing this, but they will not do this if ordered to do so (e.g. Academic 1).
Israeli attack on Gaza:
The Israeli attack on Gaza (which took place in late 2008, during the fieldwork) was viewed by many Muslims as a time when they felt compelled to exert their Muslim identity. Muslim anger was evident in the media, local communities, mosques and street demonstrations -where the majority of demonstrators were non-Muslims, a point noted as a sign of hope by many respondents. We illustrate the significance of this event with reference to one respondent (policy 8). This respondent expressed both anger and the determination to make her contribution. The event clearly impacted on her sense of who she was. Reflecting the contingent nature of identity, she described herself as 'forty times a woman before a Muslim before the Gaza conflict, forty times a Muslim than a woman now', thus revealing the inter-subjective and interactional order of identity formation (Evergeti 2006b Young Muslim women and men (in alliance with non-Muslim) students were prominent in demonstrations and other action, including peaceful sit-ins in 22 British universities -agreements with the university administrations to end sit-ins, resulted in pledges of several million pounds in book and equipment aid to Palestinian universities.
This respondent made an important distinction between Muslim and Islamic identities. The former she described, as a 'cultural' identity, not tied to religiosity but to a sense of belonging to the Muslim
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Ummah. Therefore outrage may be equally felt among the devout in the mosque as among the less devout in the pub (see also Samad, 1992) .
Conclusions
We have presented the perspectives of our respondents without laboriously comparing and contrasting the views of the three categories of 'elite', nor of men and women. Instead we have brought out differences where appropriate. We have noted that the older respondents found it difficult to maintain a sustained narrative around Muslimness and some framed Muslim oppression in terms of racism. Many have noted the racialisation of Muslims, which justifies their treatment as an undifferentiated threat to civilisation (Kundani, 2007; Brown 2008; Naber, 2009; Grewal, 2009) . Mostly, women and men held similar perspectives. However, women were more likely to refer to issues of gender than men, but several of the men accepted that Muslims were less accepting of women than was Islam, a theme of recent Muslim feminist scholarship (e.g. Ahmed, 1992; Wadud, 2007) . The participants' accounts in this study demonstrate diverse ways of being Muslim, the challenges that Muslims in Britain face and how they negotiate plural identities.
It was evident in our respondents' narratives that their orientation to different identities becomes an important link between interaction and encompassing social order (Zimmerman 1998) . Activities in a certain setting produce 'identities-as-context' (for example 'Muslim identity' post 9/11) where participants continuously realign their situated identities in order to assume or resist a particular meaning attached to them (e.g. 'terrorist'). 'Muslim' becomes the 'master status' (Hughes 1945) , both externally assigned and, at least by many, aspired to internally. The master status carries with it cultural stereotypes such as 'terrorist' or 'extremist', as 'auxiliary traits'. We have noted the efforts to resist these external impositions with reference to the historical and spatial diversity of Islam (Fletcher 1992; Armstrong 2000) . We also noted the tension among some respondents, straining to maintain a narrative of unity by referring to normative positions of oneness of Islam, while at least temporarily ignoring defacto diversity and division (Werbner 1991).
The relationship of Muslimness to the state apparatus of definition and control was also noted. British foreign policy was noted as a problem and associated, by our respondents, with radicalization of young men. Respondents resisted external impositions of Muslim leadership, arguing for a plurality of leadership, including leadership by younger people. While many were critical of the current status of Muslim leadership, we also noted welcome positive leadership being provided by women and younger people, and according to some respondents, a new mood to challenge oppression of fellow Muslims.
However, just as Section 11 funding in the 1980s was recognized for its perverse impact on creating 
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Identities become transparent on boundaries of social interaction. While our respondents note that the construction of Muslim identity and its alignment with 'otherness' has impacted on the everyday interactions with non-Muslims, the meanings of Muslimness come into sharper relief during, what we have called, 'key moments'. We chose two key moments which our respondents regarded as particularly significant in 'making us Muslims', and the third because of its currency as it took place during data collection. The Rushdie affair and September 11 were regarded as key definitional moments which impacted not just on public association of Muslims with intolerance, alienness and danger, they also challenged both the theoretical nomenclature for understanding population diversity in Britain and the policy apparatuses constructed around notions of culture, race and racism (see Sardar and Davies 1990; Parekh 1990; Modood 1990 , and on 2001 street disturbances, Amin 2002).
In this study, the notion of being a 'Muslim' presents itself as a complex and contested construction, differentially and contingently espoused by the Muslim community, often competing with other identifications (see Baumann 1996 for broader debate), but uniformly imposed externally as a homogenous identity. 
